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prices and quantities from the model exhibit the key features observed in a set of high quality transaction-level
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the case in which the dealer must post a single price to all customers.  We find the cost to the dealer
of posting a uniform price to be extremely small.
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Which type of selling method can achieve the highest revenue for the seller? Common examples of differ-
ent types of selling methods are posted prices, privately negotiated prices, and auctions. This paper looks
speciﬁcally at the revenue advantage of price discrimination resulting from privately negotiated prices in
the context of a ﬁsh market.
We solve and estimate a dynamic proﬁt-maximization model of a ﬁsh wholesaler. Stocks of ﬁsh arrive
every morning and the ﬁsh must be sold within a relatively short period of time. Throughout the day,
customers arrive sequentially and randomly, but when a customer shows up, the seller observes his type
and thus knows his price elasticity. Therefore the seller can price discriminate across different types of
buyers. The ﬁsh seller is solving two problems simultaneously: 1) how to optimally price his stock of
ﬁsh which is falling in value over time and is replenished only once a day; and 2) how to optimally price
discriminate across customers with differing price elasticities.
Our model is able to successfully match several key features of the Fulton ﬁsh market. In particular the
model predicts, as we see in the data, that Asian customers pay about 5 cents per pound less for ﬁsh than
white customers. More generally the model matches the mean and variance of prices with large differences
in prices across different days as well as considerable intra-day price volatility. Overall, we conclude that
the model is a reasonable approximation of the behavior of a Fulton ﬁsh market dealer.
We then impose the restriction that the ﬁsh seller must post a uniform price to all customers, and is
thereforeunabletopricediscriminate. Inthiscase, theinelasticwhitecustomerspaylowerprices, purchase
larger quantities of ﬁsh, and make more frequent purchases. The more price-elastic Asian customers pay
higher prices and purchase less ﬁsh. The revenue gain from the larger, more frequent, white purchases
essentially offsets the loss in revenue from the smaller Asian purchases. Consequently, in this dataset and
with this model, we ﬁnd only a very small cost to posting a single price.
While our model is intended to provide an accurate representation of the behavior of a particular ﬁsh
wholesaler, the problem of determining the optimal price of a stock of depreciating assets is a classic
problem in economics and operations research. In operations research the study of dynamically pricing an
inventory stock falls under the headings revenue management or yield management.1 In the economics lit-
erature, workby Reagan(1982), Aguirregabiria(1999), Zettelmeyer, ScottMorton andSilva-Risso(2003),
Chan, Hall, and Rust (2004), Sweeting (2008), and Copeland, Dunn, and Hall (2009) study the interaction
1This literature which started with Whiten (1955) and Karlin and Carr (1962) is reviewed by Federgruen and Heching (1999)
and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003).
2between inventory management and pricing. Our model differs from these others in that the timing of
new procurements of inventories is ﬁxed though the quantity is stochastic. While these other papers have
focused on durable goods, such as automobiles and steel, or goods that expire at a pre-determined date,
such as baseball tickets, hotel rooms and airline seats, our paper focuses on ﬁsh – a good that depreciates
steadily but quickly.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the importance of price discrimination
and previous papers that have highlighted discriminatory settings. In section 3, we discuss the details of
the Fulton ﬁsh market, the market on which our structural model is based. In section 4 we develop our
model, and in section 5, we present our strategy for estimating the model. We report our ﬁndings in section
6 and conclude our analysis in section 7.
2 Price Discrimination versus a Single Posted Price
Inanearlyempiricalpaperonpricediscrimination, Borenstein(1991)demonstratedpricediscriminationin
the retail gasoline market, a market that at ﬁrst glance appeared to be more competitive than monopolistic
(and in this way similar to the Fulton ﬁsh market) by estimating price-cost margins. More recent work has
focused on demonstrating price discrimination through structural models. For example, Hastings (2009)
focuses on wholesale price discrimination in the gasoline market by using wholesale transaction prices,
retail prices and quantities. Hastings speciﬁcally looks at the question of whether eliminating wholesale
pricediscriminationwouldimprovewelfarebyconstructingandestimatingastructural model. Villas-Boas
(2009) also looks at the question of whether eliminating wholesale price discrimination would improve
welfare, but does it in the context of the yogurt market and does this without having access to wholesale
prices. The paper that is closest in methodology to this paper is Chan, Hall and Rust (2004), in which the
authors compare the case of price discrimination in the steel market by a wholesaler to the case of uniform
pricing by estimating a dynamic model of price discrimination and inventory adjustment.
Understanding the advantages of uniform pricing – often imposed by posted prices – over price dis-
crimination is an important endeavor. With advances in information technology, more markets are going
to posted prices or public auctions. For example, the secondary market in Treasury securities used to be
a market with privately negotiated prices, but now much of the market is a posted-price market. As Rust
and Hall (2003) argue, posting a ﬁxed price eliminates the need for consumers to engage in costly search
and thus may increase demand from consumers with high search costs. Yet, some markets, such as the
3market for buying a car, essentially remain a market with negotiated prices. Negotiated prices allow third-
degree price discrimination – where different groups of customers are charged a different price based on
an observable characteristic. More elastic consumers are charged lower prices, and less elastic consumers
are charged higher prices. This can lead to “unfair” outcomes, such as when Ayres and Siegelman (1995)
showed that blacks and women paid higher prices for cars at dealerships.
Whydosomemarketsremainmarketswithnegotiatedpricesandothershavepostedprices? Wholesale
markets, and markets with large demand and supply shocks, such as steel, automobiles, secondary security
markets, and ﬁsh markets often have negotiated prices, whereas most items that are purchased on a regular
basis have posted prices. Negotiated prices allow the ability to price discriminate. Everything else equal,
if a ﬁrm has the ability to price discriminate, then the ﬁrm can raise its revenue. However, everything
else is very rarely equal. The ability to price discriminate raises negotiation costs for the seller. It also
raises search costs for the buyers and psychic costs to being treated unfairly. Through posted prices, ﬁrms
can often raise quantity demanded. The extent to which a market remains privately negotiated or goes to
posted prices largely rests on whether the often hard-to-measure costs of price discrimination outweigh
the measurable revenue beneﬁts. Even if a part of the market remains a privately negotiated market,
markets that have partly migrated to the internet can lose their ability to price discriminate. Scott Morton,
Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso(2003) ﬁnd that the groups who pay the highest prices under negotiated prices
beneﬁt the most from buying cars off the internet.
3 The Fulton Fish Market
In this section, we provide details of the Fulton ﬁsh market. Through a contact at the Fulton ﬁsh market
in New York City, one of the authors, Kathryn Graddy, collected a detailed set of transaction level data for
a single ﬁsh dealer for 22 weeks from December 2, 1991 to May 8, 1992 (111 business days and 2,868
transactions) for one type of ﬁsh: whiting. For each transaction, she collected the order the transaction
occurred, the price paid, the quantity sold, the quality of the ﬁsh, and several characteristics of the buyer
(e.g. race, location and type of retail outlet). For each day in the sample, Graddy also collected the
quantity of whiting received and discarded by this dealer and the weather. These data have been described
and extensively analyzed in Graddy (1995), Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000), Graddy (2006), Lee
(2007), and Graddy and Kennedy (2009). Given that these data are high quality and that the ﬁsh seller’s
problem is relativity straight forward and well understood, we wish to formulate a structural model that can
4replicate the main features of these data. We have attempted to make our model an accurate representation
of a Fulton ﬁsh market dealer focusing on the following details of this market.
At the time the data were collected in the early 1990s, the market was open for business from 3:00 to
9:00 in the morning on Monday and Thursday and from 4:00 to 9:00 on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday.
There were 60 registered dealers in the market, but only 35 wholesalers actively operating in the market.
Not all dealers carried all types of ﬁsh. Only six major dealers sold whiting.2
The whiting was supplied by ﬁshermen’s cooperatives, packing houses, and smaller ﬁshing boats in
New Jersey, Long Island, and Connecticut each day before the market opens. The price the dealer paid
a supplier for a particular day’s supply of whiting was determined at the end of the day by the prices the
dealer received for the whiting on that particular day. Each supplier serviced multiple dealers. A supplier
would refuse to deliver ﬁsh to a dealer from whom he continually received a poor price relative to other
dealers. In this way, dealers competed with each other for ﬁsh supplied in the future by the amount they
paid the suppliers for ﬁsh on a particular day. The dealer stated that he kept 5-15 cents on each pound of
whiting sold (although this margin could not be independently veriﬁed).
A dealer often had a good idea of the quantity that would be available before the market’s close on
the previous day. Quantity supplied was primarily determined by weather conditions with wind and waves
being the most important determinant of the quantity of ﬁsh caught. Days were classiﬁed as stormy when
wave heights were greater than 4.5 feet and wind speed is greater than 18 knots. Wind speed and wave
height are moving averages of the last three days’ wind speed and wave height before the trading day, as
measured off the coast of Long Island and reported in the New York Times boating forecast. Quantities fall
and prices rise when there are storms, and quantities rise and prices fall in good weather. Holding day of
the week constant, the average quantity sold on a clear day was 2,371 pounds more than on a stormy day.
Conversely, the average price was 32 cents less per pound than on a clear day.
The quantity of whiting delivered for a particular day was received in its entirety before the market
opened. If one dealer did not receive what he perceived to be enough whiting, another dealer would sell
him whiting before the market opened. The price was set not at the time of sale, but was determined toward
the end of the trading day.
Anyone could purchase ﬁsh at the Fulton ﬁsh market, but small quantities were not sold. For whiting,
the minimum quantity sold was one box, approximately 60 pounds (except as favors to regular customers).
2Data on whiting were collected for three reasons. More transactions take place in whiting than in any other ﬁsh. Whiting do
not vary substantially in size and quality. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dealer from whom the data were collected
suggested that the whiting salesman would be the only salesman amenable to having an observer.
5Most of the customers were repeat buyers, but buyer-seller relationships varied. Some buyers regularly
purchased from one seller, and other buyers purchased from various sellers. Most buyers followed distinct
purchasing patterns. Monday, Thursday and Friday were big days, while Tuesday and Wednesday were
relatively quiet. Whiting stayed sufﬁciently fresh to sell for at most four days after it was received. How-
ever, it was usually sold either the day that it was received or the day after. About half of the time, the total
quantity received exceeded total sales. As would be expected, there was a small amount of oversupply as
some inventory loss is inevitable in the selling process, especially given the perishable nature of ﬁsh. Over
111 days in late 1991 and early 1992, the total quantity received exceeded the total quantity sold by 11,237
pounds, which amounts to about 1.6 percent of total sales. The bulk of this difference consisted of ﬁsh that
was not sufﬁciently fresh to sell and was literally thrown out.
The Fulton ﬁsh market had no posted prices and each dealer was free to charge a different price to each
customer. If a customer wished to buy a particular quantity of ﬁsh, he would ask a seller for the price. The
seller would quote a price and the customer would usually either buy the ﬁsh or walk away. Prices were
generally quoted in ﬁve-cent increments. Sellers were discreet when naming a price. A particular price
was for a particular customer.
Prices varied tremendously. For example, the average price in a whiting transaction on Friday, May 1,
1992, was $.33/lb., and the average price on Friday, May 8, was $1.75/lb., an increase of almost six-fold.
Figure 1 is a high-low price chart, where the bottom of the vertical line shows the low price for that day
and the top of the vertical line shows the high price for that day. The high intraday volatility was primarily
due to changes in price throughout the day, but some of the volatility could be attributed to differences in
qualities of ﬁsh. There was often a large decline in price after 7:00 a.m, but the pattern before 7:00 a.m. is
not easily predictable. There was a higher intraday volatility on Friday than on other days.
Figure 2 indicates total daily sales, which varied considerably. Daily supply shocks, primarily caused
by weather, were largely responsible for the high volatility in day-to-day prices. The simple correlation
between total daily sales and average daily price is -.32.
About 60 percent of the purchasers at the market were Asian. Graddy observed that sellers were
quoting lower prices to Asian customers for the same box of ﬁsh. The price difference would usually
be about 5 cents, though it could go to as large as 10 cents. Regressions that carefully control for other
variables, including time of sale and quality, indicated that whites pay on average 6.3 cents per pound
more on each transaction for the same type and quality of ﬁsh than do Asian buyers (Graddy, 1995). While
quality controls could naturally be imperfect, these regressions were consistent with observations.
6Figure 1: Day-to-Day Prices for Whiting (in $ per pound)
These price differences were able to persist due to the different characteristics of the buyers. There was
strong anecdotal evidence that Asian buyers were more elastic than white buyers. Asians buyers would
resell their whiting as whole ﬁsh in retail shops, ﬁsh sandwiches in fry shops, and would make them into
ﬁsh balls. Most of these establishments were located in very poor neighborhoods. Resellers had little
scope to raise the price of whiting for their ultimate customers. Consequently, they would bargain very
hard at the market.
In contrast, many white buyers (though not all) had more scope to pass on prices to customers. For
example, for the local ﬁsh dealer in Princeton, New Jersey, whiting was a very small part of his purchase;
he would spend no time shopping around for price on whiting. If prices were especially high at the market,
he could explain to his customers that ﬁsh were expensive at Fulton Street and his customers would often
be willing to absorb costs by paying higher prices. Finally since prices were quoted discretely and white
buyers rarely socialized with Asian buyers it is unlikely that either white buyers or Asian buyers knew that
each group was being charged different prices.
7Figure 2: Day-to-Day Volumes of Whiting (in pounds)
Given the small number of dealers (six at the time) who carried whiting and the long tenure of many
of the dealers, the structure of the Fulton ﬁsh market for whiting, at least in the early 1990s, appeared
conducive to tacit collusion, rather than perfect competition. Dealers traded with each other before the
market opened. They would price ﬁsh on a daily and sometimes hourly basis and would receive feedback
from the buyers on other dealers’ prices. Dealers in such a situation could easily become very good at tacit
communication. Moreover, entry into this market was limited because suppliers provided the whiting on
credit to established dealers - and it is not clear they would be willing to provide ﬁsh on credit to a new
entrant. The presence of organized crime in the market may also have discouraged entry. Hence there is
little reason to expect the extraordinary proﬁts earned from price discrimination to be competed away.
4 The Model
In this section we present our dynamic, proﬁt maximization model of a ﬁsh dealer. The model is designed
to be consistent with the structure of the Fulton ﬁsh market and to capture the basic features of the price
8and quantity data presented above. In this spirit, there are shocks to both supply and demand. The daily
supply of ﬁsh is stochastic and depends on the weather with storms reducing the average size of the catch.
On the demand side, the arrival of customers each day is uncertain and their individual demand curves
vary as well. Fish can be stored but depreciates quickly. As customers arrive sequentially, the ﬁsh dealer
chooses a price for each individual customer. If he sets too high a price, he risks having ﬁsh go bad; if he
sets too low a price, he foregoes the potential to sell the ﬁsh to subsequent customers at a higher price. The
dealer can price discriminate since he observes each customer’s type before quoting a price. The optimal
pricing strategy is determined by recursively solving his dynamic optimization problem.
Formally, our ﬁctional ﬁsh seller is open for business ﬁve days a week, Monday through Friday, for ﬁve
hours each day. At the start of each workday, he receives a catch, C, which varies by the day of the week
and the weather. The weather can be in one of two states, calm or stormy, and follows a Markov chain.
The day’s catch is drawn from a truncated log-normal distribution with a mean µc(d;w) and a standard
deviation sc(d;w) with d = 1;2;:::;5 denoting the day of the week (Monday-Friday) and w denoting the
day’s weather, as being either calm or stormy.
Each ﬁve-hour workday is divided into 60 ﬁve minute periods indexed by t. At the start of each period
t, the ﬁsh dealer holds inventory It. Customers arrive sequentially. There are two types of customers,
Asians and whites, indexed by n, who arrive with probability ln, with
l0+lasian+lwhite = 1 (1)
where l0 is the probability that no customer shows up. Only a single customer may show up during a
given period. In periodt, if a customer arrives, the ﬁsh seller observes the customer’s type. He knows each





t is distributed i.i.d N(0;sen). As in Graddy (1995) and Angrist, Graddy and Imbens (2000), we
do not allow for cross-price elasticities. Whiting is a good deal cheaper than any other ﬁsh, and within
the observed range of prices, there did not exist good substitutes. The term a(d) allows the constant term
to vary by day of the week but stays ﬁxed with the different types of customers. We normalize a(5) (i.e.
Friday) to zero. Sales, qt, are constrained to
60 · qt · It; (3)
9where It is the stock of ﬁsh available for sale at the start of period t. This constraint rules out back-orders
and implements the observed minimum purchase size of 60 pounds (one box). If at the quoted price,
the customer demands fewer than 60 pounds, no sale occurs. Thus the one-box minimum pins down the
customer’s reservation price above which he will walk away. If the customer demands more than the
current level of inventory, we set qt = It, and the dealer is stocked out until the following morning.
Fish depreciates at a constant rate throughout the day, so the evolution of the dealer’s stock follows:
It+1 = (1¡ ˜ d)It ¡qt for t = 1;2;:::;59 (4)
where ˜ d is the intra-day deprecation rate. Between weekdays, the dealer’s stock is augmented by the catch,
so the law of motion becomes
I1 = (1¡ ˆ d)I60¡q60+C(d0;w0) for d0 = 2;3;4;5 (5)
with ˆ d denoting the overnight depreciation rate. Over the weekend, this law of motion becomes
I1 = (1¡ ¯ d)I60¡q60+C(1;w0) (6)
with ¯ d denoting the over-the-weekend depreciation rate.
We assume the ﬁsh dealer’s single-period compensation function, p, is a non-linear function of the
total quantity of ﬁsh sold and total revenue:
p(pt;qt) = f0qt +f1(ptqt)f2: (7)
The ﬁrst term is a ﬁxed commission for each ﬁsh sold and the second term provides the dealer an incentive
to maximize total revenue. This compensation function is consistent with the observation that the price
paid by the dealer to the ﬁsherman (or to another dealer) is determined at the end of the day, after observing
total revenue. More generally, this function is consistent with a contract between two parties in which one
party (the supplier) wishes to induce effort and share risk with the other (the dealer). This speciﬁcation
allows for revenue maximization (i.e. f0 = 0, f2 = 1) and straight commission (i.e. f1 = 0) as special
cases.
Price Discrimination Case
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the ﬁsh dealer observes the customer’s type and is able to set a
private price. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁsh dealer knows his inventory on hand, I, the type of customer he faces,
10n, the weather w, the day of the week, d, and the period, t, when he chooses a price, p. We abstract
from haggling, assuming the dealer makes a single take-it-or-leave-it price quote. After quoting a price,
he learns e and thus q. Let V(I;n;w;d;t) denote the value to the ﬁsh dealer with state I;n;w;d;t. The ﬁsh




E p(p;q(p))+E bV((1¡ ˜ d)(I¡q(p));n0;w;d;t +1)
o
for t = 1;2;:::;59 (8)
where b 2 (0;1) is the intra-day discount factor, and p(p;q) is given by (7). The dealer’s optimization
problem is subject to the demand function (2) and the constraint on sales (3).
Note that other dealers’ prices are excluded from the value function. This speciﬁcation is consistent
with the situation in which all dealers are maximizing the same value function. Hence, dealers can be
tacitly colluding. This is not an unrealistic assumption as dealers have been making identical pricing
decisions, period after period, day after day, and year after year for nearly a hundred years in some cases.3
At the end of Mondays through Thursdays, ˆ d, fraction of the inventory spoils, a new catch is drawn,





E p(p;q(p))+E ˆ bV((1¡ ˆ d)(I¡q)+C(d+1;w0);n0;w0;d+1;1)
o
(9)
where ˆ b is the inter-day discount factor. If d = 5 (i.e. Friday), the continuation value in equation (9)
becomes Eˆ bV((1¡ ¯ d)(I¡q)+C(1;w0);n0;w0;1;1).
The solution to the dealer’s problem yields a decision rule for pricing:
˜ p = ˜ p(I;n;w;d;t): (10)
In general an analytical solution for the constraint on sales, ˜ p, is not available; but, ignoring the con-
straint (3) and setting f0 = 0, f2 = 1 and sn









This is the standard monopoly pricing rule, but in this case the ﬁrm’s marginal cost is the shadow value to
the ﬁrm of a unit of inventory next period. In other words, the cost to the dealer of selling the marginal
box of ﬁsh is the foregone opportunity of selling that box next period.
3We do not have data on other dealers’ prices. No other dealers would allow an observer to record prices, although this was
attempted during the time of data collection.
11No-Price Discrimination Counter-Factual
We modify our model to obtain predictions under the assumption that our ﬁctional ﬁsh dealer is unable
to condition his price on the customer type, n. This case corresponds to a market structure in which dealers
receive all requests for price quotes through an anonymous channel such as the internet. The ﬁsh dealer
can can still condition his choice of p on I;w;d;t; but, only after announcing p does he learn n and e and
thus q.
Let V(I;w;d;t) denote the value to the ﬁsh dealer on day d with weather w at time t of having I
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E p(p;q(p))+E ˆ bV((1¡ ˆ d)(I¡q(p))+C(d+1;w0);w0;d+1;1)
o
(13)
subject to (2) and (3). As in the price discrimination case, if d = 5, the continuation value in equation (13)
becomes Eˆ bV((1¡ ¯ d)(I¡q(p))+C(1;w0);w0;1;1).
The solution to the dealer’s problem in the case of no price discrimination yields a decision rule for
pricing:
˜ p = ˜ p(I;w;d;t): (14)
5 Estimating the Model
In order to solve the model, we must ﬁrst select parameter values. For a subset of the parameters we choose
values to match observed characteristics of the market. For the remaining parameters we select values that
generate simulations from our model as close as possible to the observed time paths of prices and sales.
We are more precise about what we mean by “as close as possible” below.
We set the intra-day discount factor b to 0.999. Hence a dollar of revenue at the end of the workday
is worth only 94.2 cents (i.e. 0:99960) relative to the start of the workday. Since there are 288 ﬁve minute
intervals in 24 hours, the inter-day discount factor is set to ˆ b = b(288¡60) or 0.796. We found that having
the ﬁctional dealer signiﬁcantly discount the future allowed the model to better match the data. We suspect
this is due to the model’s simplicity with regard to quality. While Graddy (1995) considers ﬁve degrees
of quality, in our model there are only two: fresh (salable) and spoiled (unsalable). Ideally, the model
12would take into account the vintage of each ﬁsh and track its quality decline over time; but doing so would
make the model untractable. We ﬁx the value for b since estimating a discount factor so close to one is
computationally challenging.
We assume ﬁsh depreciates at a constant rate throughout the day. Since whiting can be sold for up
to four days, we set the daily depreciation rate, d, to 1
4. Since we divide the workday into ﬁve-minute
intervals, we set the intra-workday depreciation rate ˜ d = 1=288£d, and set the inter-day and over-the-
weekend depreciation rates to ˆ d = 228=288£d, and ¯ d = 67=24£d, respectively.
As stated above, each morning’s catch is drawn from a log-normal distribution with a mean µc(d;w)
and a standard deviation sc(d;w). We set the ten values of µc(d;w) and the ten values of sc(d;w) to the
observed conditional means and standard deviations of quantity received in Graddy (1995). These values







for w;w0 = fcalm, stormyg (15)
so that if it is calm today there is an 85 percent chance that tomorrow will be calm and a 15 percent chance
it will be stormy. Likewise, if today is stormy, there is a 41 percent chance of calm weather tomorrow and
a 59 percent chance of stormy weather. Consequently, today’s weather not only affect today’s catch (and
thus today’s supply) but also provides information about expected future catches and supply.
Since we do not have direct evidence on the values of the remaining parameters, we estimate them
using indirect inference. This approach selects the values for the remaining structural parameters, L, that
minimize the weighted distance between a set of observed moments and those generated by numerical
simulations of the structural model.
To capture the dynamics of the price and sales data, we choose coefﬁcients from six least-squares
regressions as moments we wish to match. In the ﬁrst set of four regressions, we summarize the within-
day variation in prices and quantities by type of customer. We partition the data by the race of the customer.
For each individual transaction, we compute the log difference between the price paid and quantity sold
from the average transaction price and quantity on that day for that customer type. For each customer
type i, we regress the de-meaned transaction prices, ˆ pi, on the de-meaned transaction quantities, ˆ qi, and
the order in which the transaction occurred, x. In a similar manner, we then regress ˆ qi, on ˆ pi, and x.
13Formally, we estimate
ˆ pasian = h1 ˆ qasian+h2x+nasian
p (16)
ˆ pwhite = h3 ˆ qwhite+h4x+nwhite
p (17)
ˆ qasian = h5 ˆ pasian+h6x+nasian
q (18)
ˆ qwhite = h7 ˆ pwhite+h8x+nwhite
q (19)
where the n’s are i.i.d. errors. We make no attempt to impose any economic interpretation to the coefﬁ-
cients. The coefﬁcients h1, h3,h5, and h7 pick up the observed intra-day, customer-type-speciﬁc correla-
tions between prices and quantities, while h2, h4, h6, and h8 capture the variation between transactions
early and late in the day.
To capture the inter-day variation in prices and sales, we regress the log of total quantity purchased,
qi
t and log of average price paid pi
t each day t by customer type i on a constant, day-of-week dum-
mies, a dummy variable equal to one for Asians (ASIAN), and a stormy-dummy interacted with ethnicity
(STORM*AS, STORM*WH). Speciﬁcally, we estimate
pi










of the six regression error terms, the fraction of transactions conducted with Asians, and the total number
of transactions for a total of 32 moments.
In the language of indirect inference, equations (16)-(21) and the additional moments comprise our
auxiliary model. We report these moments in table 2. Let L denote the vector of the structural parameters
wewishtoestimate: L=fµasian
q ; gasian; µwhite
q ; gwhite; a(1); a(2); a(3); a(4); seasian; sewhite; f0; f1; f2; lasian; lwhiteg.
Our strategy to obtain point estimates for L is:
1. Use the Fulton ﬁsh market data to compute estimates of the 32 moments described above. Call this
vector ˆ qT.
2. After choosing a set of parameters, L, solve the structural model for the value function and the
pricing rule.
143. Simulate the structural model with price discrimination for S weeks to create a synthetic dataset
yS(L). To simulate the model, draw four sets of random shocks. Each day draw the weather, w,
then, conditional on the weather and the day of the week, draw the catch C. For each period draw
the type of customers that shows up, n, (with a possibility of no customer showing up), and then
conditional on the type of customer draw the disturbance in the demand function en. The paths of
prices, quantity sold, and inventories are determined by the solution of the structural model. The set
of shocks is held ﬁxed across every choice of L.
4. Using the simulated dataset, yS(L), run the regression described above to compute the structural
model’s predictions for the moments in the auxiliary model. Call these predictions, ˆ qS(L).
5. Measure the distance between the vector of observed moments and the vector of simulated moments
via the criterion:
¡ˆ qT ¡ ˆ qS(L)
¢0
WT
¡ˆ qT ¡ ˆ qS(L)
¢
(22)
where WT is a 32£32 weighting matrix.
6. Using a hill-climbing algorithm, repeat steps 2 - 5 to ﬁnd the set of parameters ˜ LT that mini-
mizes (22).4
We construct WT so that the regression coefﬁcients are weighted by the inverse of their variance-covariance
matrices. The remaining moments are weighted by least squares. We “over-weight” the fraction of trans-
actions conducted with Asians and the total number of transactions to ensure the model closely matches
these two moments. We simulate the model for S=1320 weeks or 60 times the number of weeks in our
dataset.
To numerically solve the model, we discretize the inventory grid into 45 points from 0 to 40,000
pounds. The grid points are more densely spaced near zero where the value function has more curvature.
For each of the 45 £ 2£2 £5 £ 60 = 54;000 (I;n;w;d;t) quintuplets, we maximize the right hand side
of equations (8) and (9) recursively over the sales price. Points off the inventory grid are approximated
using linear interpolation, and all integration is done by quadrature.
4Although our dynamic model is too complex for us to provide analytical results on identiﬁcation, visual inspection of con-
centrated slices of (22) and the gradients of ˆ qS(L) give us conﬁdence that the parameters are well identiﬁed.
15µasian
q gasian µwhite
q gwhite a(1) a(2) a(3) a(4) seasian sewhite
4.53 1.67 4.32 1.49 0.021 -0.181 -0.245 0.191 0.838 0.821
0.07 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.039 0.091 0.120 0.071 0.052 0.055
f0 f1 f2 lasian lwhite
0.018 0.165 0.837 0.313 0.351
0.050 0.516 0.052 0.015 0.018
Table 1: Estimates of the Structural Parameters
Note: The ﬁrst row of the table reports point estimates. The second row of the table reports estimated standard errors.
6 Empirical Results
In table 1 we report point estimates for the structural parameters together with estimated standard errors.
The parameter values are economically sensible. The parameters in the top row determine the character-
istics of the demand curves. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Graddy (1995), we ﬁnd that Asians are more
price elastic than whites. In particular the price elasticity for whites is estimated to be 1.49 while this
elasticity for Asians is 1.67. Graddy (1995) employs a reduced-form instrumental-variables strategy that
estimated the price elasticities to be 1.33 and 1.67, respectively. Unlike the IV approach which identi-
ﬁes the elasticities from exogenous shifts in supply, our simulation estimator pins down these elasticities
primarily from the mark-up over the imputed marginal cost reported in (11). Since the basic economic
assumptions underlying both approaches are the same, it is reassuring that even with the additional struc-
tural assumptions in the current approach, both deliver an identical price elasticity for Asians and price
elasticities for whites that are well within two standard errors of each other.
Counterintuitively, despite the fact that whites have a more elastic demand than Asians, the estimated
elasticities along with the constant terms imply their reservation prices are lower. From the constant
elasticity demand curve (2) and minimum purchase size constraint (3), if we assume a(d) and e are zero,
the reservation price for whites is $1.16 while the reservation price for Asians is 13 cents higher at $1.29.
The standard deviations of the demand disturbances, seasian and sewhite, are essentially identical. The
large negative numbers for a(2) and a(3) are consistent with the observation that Tuesdays and Wednes-
days are quiet relative to Mondays, Thursdays, and Fridays.
The positive point estimates of f0, f1, and f2 suggest that the dealer is not simply maximizing total
revenue, though neither f0 nor f1 are signiﬁcatively different from zero. Since the point estimate of f2
16is less than one, the dealer’s compensation is a concave function of revenue. These parameters imply the
distribution of our ﬁctional dealer’s earnings has a mean of 8.1 cents per pound with a standard deviation
of 2.2 cents. This matches the dealer’s statement that he keeps 5-15 cents of each pound sold.
To evaluate the model’s ability to match the basic characteristics of the data, we report three compar-
isons between the model’s implications for price and quantity sold and the observed data. For the ﬁrst set
of comparisons, table 2 tabulates two sets of estimated regression coefﬁcients: one using the observed Ful-
ton ﬁsh market data and one computed from 1000 simulations of 22 weeks of the model at the estimated
parameter values.5 As described in the previous section, the structural parameters reported in table 1 were
chosen so that the model’s predictions for these moments are as close as possible to the observed moments.
The model matches several key facts in the data. Consider the within day price regressions reported in
the top panel of table 2. For both Asians and whites, the model matches that higher prices are associated
with lower quantities and that prices decline on average throughout the day. For both races, the model’s
coefﬁcients are well within two standard deviations of the coefﬁcients estimated from the data.6
For the within day quantity regressions, reported in the middle panel, the model matches the negative
relationship between quantity and price. For both races, the coefﬁcients for the model are within a single
standard deviation of the coefﬁcients for the data. The model also predicts, consistent with the data, that
quantity sold declines throughout the day, though not to the magnitude seen in the data.
In the inter day regressions reported in the bottom panel, the model matches the fact that during stormy
weather, both Asians and whites pay higher prices and purchase less ﬁsh. From the estimated coefﬁcients
on the Asian indicator variable, we see the model also replicates the fact that Asians pay less and purchase
more on average than whites. The model does less well matching the coefﬁcients on the day-of-week
indicator variables, but given their large standard errors, our estimation procedure puts relatively little
weight on matching these coefﬁcients.
The model predicts that 52 percent of the sales are conducted with Asians. The point estimates of
lasian and lwhite reported in table 1 imply that on average, 18.8 Asian and 21.0 white customers show up
per day. However since Asians have a higher reservation price than whites, they walk away less frequently
than whites. On an average day, only 5.1 Asians, compared to 8.5 whites, walk away after receiving a
5That is, we simulate the model 1000 times creating 1000 synthetic 22-week data sets. We run the six regressions on each of
these data sets, and report the mean and standard deviation for each statistic.
6Even though the lengths of the simulated data sets and the Fulton data set are the same, the model generates many more
observations than reported under the observed column. In the Fulton data set, for 1527 transactions the race is either not observed
or is another race beside Asian or white (e.g. African-American). In the model, the race of all customers is observed and all
customers are either Asian or white. The model does match the observed total number of transactions.
17Within Day Price Regressions
Asian White
observed simulated observed simulated
variable coeff s.e. coeff s.d. coeff s.e. coeff s.d.
quantity -0.055 0.007 -0.056 0.006 -0.048 0.011 -0.063 0.008
trans num -0.045 0.007 -0.038 0.009 -0.049 0.011 -0.051 0.011
root MSE 0.158 0.133 0.006 0.125 0.146 0.007
R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.03
observations 992 1502 49 349 1373 55
Within Day Quantity Regressions
Asian White
observed simulated observed simulated
variable coeff s.e. coeff s.d. coeff s.e. coeff s.d.
price -1.160 0.141 -1.271 0.131 -1.052 0.244 -0.962 0.107
trans num -0.173 0.033 -0.014 0.023 -0.096 0.054 -0.012 0.021
root MSE 0.724 0.633 0.014 0.581 0.571 0.015
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.01
observations 992 1502 49 349 1373 55
Inter-Day Regressions
Price Quantity
observed simulated observed simulated
variable coeff s.e. coeff s.d. coeff s.e. coeff s.d.
constant -0.239 0.063 -0.245 0.064 7.362 0.142 7.938 0.127
monday -0.101 0.079 0.108 0.092 -0.098 0.177 -0.195 0.180
tuesday -0.043 0.077 0.226 0.090 -0.681 0.173 -0.733 0.187
wednesday 0.003 0.079 0.142 0.088 -0.484 0.176 -0.620 0.177
thursday 0.061 0.077 0.186 0.084 -0.006 0.172 -0.128 0.166
asian -0.092 0.059 -0.108 0.012 0.627 0.131 0.419 0.068
stormy-white 0.359 0.078 0.166 0.071 -0.253 0.176 -0.380 0.162
stormy-asian 0.339 0.078 0.172 0.071 -0.659 0.174 -0.354 0.177
root MSE 0.369 0.299 0.019 0.826 0.687 0.044
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.23 0.27 0.06
observations 221 220 – 221 220 –
Total number of transactions: observed = 2868; simulated = 2875 (std = 88)
Fraction of transactions conducted with Asian customers: observed 0.52; simulated 0.52 (std = 0.01)
Table 2: Regression Results Using Observed and Simulated Data
This table reports two sets of the six regressions described in section 5. For each regression, the ﬁrst set reports the results using
the Fulton ﬁsh market data. Along with each estimated coefﬁcient we report the associate standard error. The second set reports
the mean point estimate and associated standard deviation from 1000 simulations of 22 weeks from the model.
18price offer. Thus on an typical day Asians make 13.7 purchases while whites make 12.5 purchases.
As a second measure of the model’s ability to match the basic characteristics of the data, we compare
the model’s implications for prices and sales to the observed means and standard deviations ﬁrst reported
in Graddy (1995).7 In table 3, we see that the model does a good job matching the means and standard
deviations of prices for Monday through Thursday. In particular, the model matches the average price dif-
ference paid by whites and Asians. For quantities, the model slightly underestimates the average purchase
size. It also underestimates the volatility of the purchase quantity. The model does replicate that Asians
tend to buy in larger quantities than whites.
As discussed in section 3, Fridays are a day of high volatility. While the standard deviation of prices
is about 0.3 on the four other days, it is 0.45 on Friday. The model underestimates both the mean and the
volatility of prices on Fridays. It get the mean quantity sold about right though it slightly underestimates
the standard deviation of sales. This counterfactual prediction occurs despite the model taking into account
the “specialness” of Fridays in three ways. First, through the a parameters the model allows the level of
demand to differ on Fridays. Second, the model takes into account that a large fraction of the ﬁsh will
depreciate over the weekend. Third, the model is parameterized so that Friday catches have both a high
mean and a high standard deviation. It may be that demand is more inelastic or that demand is more
variable on Fridays than on the other days. The model holds the elasticity of demand and the volatility of
demand constant across days.
The model appears to dramatically overestimate the amount discarded. The reported discards in the
data are the quantities recorded or observed thrown out. If discards are measured as the difference be-
tween ﬁsh received and ﬁsh sold, the average daily discard is about 175 pounds. The model still slightly
overestimates the amount discarded, but its’ estimates are reasonable.
As a third and ﬁnal comparison between the model’s predictions and the actual data, we plot in ﬁgure 3
a high-low price chart for a single 22 week simulation of the model. Comparing this graph to the high-low
price chart in ﬁgure 1 we see that the model is successful in matching the wide variation in prices. Just as
we see in the actual data, there are days in which the low price exceeds another day’s high price. Both the
actual and simulated price series exhibit 10-15 day cycles, though these cycles are much more pronounced
in the actual data.
To illustrate the intuition underlying these results, we plot in ﬁgure 4 the dealer’s derived pricing rule,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Simulated Day-to-Day Prices
equation (10), for white customers on calm Thursdays.8 This graph shows the optimal price as a function
of inventories and within-day time periods. Time goes from 1 (start of day) to 60 (end of day). It is
clear that holding time ﬁxed, prices are a decreasing function of the level of inventories. As inventories
approach zero, the marginal value to the seller of an additional box of ﬁsh rises sharply; thus so does
its’ price. Similarly, holding inventories ﬁxed, prices are a decreasing function of time of day. Since
inventories are steadily decreasing throughout the day, depending on the initial level of inventories and the
sequence of demand shocks, the model can generate upward or downward within-day price paths, though
as reported in the top panel of table 2, on average prices fall throughout the day.
While we can statistically reject with a high degree of conﬁdence that our structural model is not the
true data generating process, overall we ﬁnd it to be a realistic representation of a Fulton ﬁsh market seller.
The model’s design incorporates the characteristics of the ﬁsh seller’s problem that Graddy observed ﬁrst-
hand. The economic intuition derived from the model’s solution is consistent with the observed price and
quantity data as well as the anecdotal evidence. Finally the model successfully imitates many of the key
features of the observed transaction data. We now employ this model to perform a counterfactual exercise:
8In this case n = white and d = 4. There are 19 other corresponding graphs for each day of the week, type of weather, and





























Figure 4: Dealer’s Optimal Pricing Rule for White Customers on Calm Thursdays
assuming the ﬁrm can no longer price discriminate.
Using the parameter values reported in table 1, we solve the model under the no-price-discrimination
assumptions, equations (12) and (13). In table 4 we report the means and standard deviations of prices and
quantities with and without price discrimination. Interestingly, if the ﬁctional dealer is unable to charge
different prices to Asians and whites, it has only a modest effect on the average price paid. Although
they now face the same prices, Asians on average pay a higher price than whites. This is due to whites’
lower reservation price. In the no-price-discrimination case whites walk away less frequently than they do
under the price-discrimination case (7.6 versus 8.5 times per day) while Asians walk away from a slightly
larger number of price offers in the no price discrimination case (5.6 versus 5.1 per day). This endogenous
censoring of the price data implies that whites on average pay a slightly lower price that Asians.
In table 4 we see that since Asians pay higher prices in the no price discrimination case they purchase
a little less. Since their price elasticity is greater than one, total revenue from Asian customers falls. White
customers, on the other hand, now pay lower prices, so their average purchase size rises. Furthermore
they make more frequent purchases. Hence, revenue from whites goes up, completely offsetting the lost
22variable observed price discrim no-price-discrim
Price/transaction 0.865 0.850 0.841
($/pound) (0.360) (0.298) (0.291)
Price/trans (Asian) 0.842 0.823 0.846
($/pound) (0.353) (0.282) (0.292)
Price/trans (white) 0.892 0.881 0.836
($/pound) (0.321) (0.311) (0.290)
Average quantity 249 226 224
per sale (pounds) (303) (342) (238)
Average quantity 288 253 247
per sale (Asian) (308) (274) (268)
Average quantity 203 196 201
per sale (white) (291) (196) (201)
Daily Revenue $2,684 $2,499 $2,414
from Asians (1,652) (1,100) (1,093)
Daily Revenue 1,552 1,906 2,015
from Whites (1,095) (939) (903)
Total Daily 3,993 4,405 4,429
Revenue (2,207) (1,689) (1,651)
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations With and Without Price Discrimination
23revenue from Asian customers. Hence there is no loss in revenue from setting a posted price. In this case
revenue actually rises slightly.
Ofcourse, inthepricediscriminationcase, thedealerisabletochargebothtypesofcustomersidentical
prices, so why is revenue higher in the constrained case? Recall that the dealer’s compensation function,
(7), is a non-linear function of total revenue. Under the no price discrimination case, average dealer
earnings falls by 1/10 of a penny per pound. Hence the dealer makes only slightly more if he can price
discriminate.
7 Interpretation and Conclusion
We conclude that our model is a realistic approximation to the observed ﬁsh seller’s problem; however, like
all models, it is a stark simpliﬁcation of reality. It is possible that these simpliﬁcations non-trivially bias
downward our computed cost of eliminating price discrimination. In the model, both prices and quantities
are continuous variables, while at the Fulton ﬁsh market, prices tended to be quoted in 5 cent increments
and ﬁsh were generally sold in 60 pound boxes. This endogenous discreetness may create kinks and non-
convexities that create wedges between the prices it is optimal to charge Asians and whites. Since there
is no physical reason for prices to be quoted in such coarse increments, this norm may provide a simple
mechanism to limit bargaining and competition thus providing a greater opportunity to price discriminate.
More importantly, the model assumes that the price elasticity for both races is constant across the entire
demand curve. While the replication of Graddy’s (1995) estimates of these elasticities provides evidence
that our point estimates are robust, it may be that these elasticities are constant only along a portion of the
demand curves. It may be that as quantity demanded gets closer to the minimum purchase size (i.e. 60
pounds), demand become more inelastic. If this is the case, our analysis underestimates the reservation
price for whites, underestimating the value to the seller of price discriminating.
While, the result that price discrimination yields very little additional revenue may be due to short-
comings of our model, it is also possible that sellers continue to price discriminate despite the lack of
evidence that it results in increased revenue. Many of the dealers at the market have been operating for
years. Indeed, the grandfather of the dealer from which the data were collected started his business in
the 1920s. The way of transacting at the market is well-established and negotiated prices are the norm,
based on history, despite any analytical evidence that these actually provide the highest revenue. Other ﬁsh
markets, including the largest market, Skidjee in Japan, conduct business through an auction process. It is
24possible that negotiated prices resulting in price discrimination may not be the optimal way to sell ﬁsh, but
that this method simply exists because of inertia.
258 Appendix: Means and Standard Deviations for Daily Fish Received
In this appendix we report the means µc(d;w) and standard deviation sc(d;w) of the catch conditional on
day of the week and weather. These parameters, together with the Markov transition matrix, (15), yield
unconditional daily means and standard deviations of quantity received consistent with those reported in
table 1 on page 79 of Graddy (1995).
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
Calm 9058 5197 4823 7783 8123
(7110) (5034) (3568) (4386) (4463)
Stormy 6596 2464 5106 4288 7264
(3911) (2340) (3681) (3652) (7456)
Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of the Catch Conditional on Day or Week and Weather
In pounds of Whiting. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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